Keeping Casinos Clean: The Problem with Dirty Money and International Differences in Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Casinos by Kleiman, Kerry E.
KEEPING CASINOS CLEAN: 
THE PROBLEM WITH DIRTY MONEY AND 
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS 
CASINOS * 
by E. Kleiman** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1930s, America's youth has been told, "crime doesn't pay."1 
However, the fact of the matter is that crime does pay.2 Handsomely, and in 
* This Note originally appeared in connection with the International 
Association of Gaming Advisors (IAGA) Shannon Bybee Award competition. This 
version has been updated to reflect recent developments in regulatory enforcement, 
as well as using more current values and statistics regarding gaming revenue. 
** Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2015, William S, Boyd School of Law, 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to everyone who has helped with the 
development and revision of this note, including my family, for pretending to care 
while I prattled on about money laundering regulations, I would like to give a 
special thanks to Professors Berkheiser, Rapoport, and Scharf for their support and 
guidance over the years. Finally, I would like to thank Jennifer Carleton, Jennifer 
Roberts, and Erica Okerberg for inspiring me and being exemplary role models. 
"Crime Doesn't Pay" - Efforts of the 1930s Press, FADED GLORY: DUSTY 
ROADS OF AN FBI ERA, http://historicalgmen.squarespace.com/crime-doesnt-pay-
efforts-·of/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015). Although originally used in the 1930s as 
something of a slogan by the FBI to discourage young men from glamorizing 
gangsters, the concept caught on and wove its way into pop culture through comic 
strips such as Dick Tracy. Eventually, in the 1940s and '50s, ''Crime Does Not 
Pay" was the name of a comic book series that graphically depicted true crime 
stories, which became a linchpin for the arguments of pro-censorship advocates. 
Heidi MacDonald, Reprints in Review: The Lurid World Pre-Code 
COMICS BEAT (Mar. 27, 2012), http://comicsbeat.com/reprints-in-review-the-lurid-
world-of-pre-code-crime-columnJ. 
2 Not every criminal act yields a net profit, nor does each individual criminal 
realize monetary gain from his crimes. In fact, economic data suggests that low-
81 
82 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:81 
cash. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has estimated that the 
gross revenue from illicit activity in 2009 was $2.1 trillion.3 It is estimated that 
$1.6 trillion of this $2.1 trillion was laundered, and therefore incorporated into 
the lawful economy and ultimately reinvested in the criminal enterprises.4 
"Money laundering" is the generally accepted term used to describe the 
process by which people take proceeds of illegal activities-such as drug sales 
or gun running-and use them in "legitimate" transactions, such as gambling in 
a legal gaming establishment, with the goal of concealing the true, unlawful 
origin of the funds. 5 However, there are ramifications of money laundering far 
beyond a criminal getting a hefty paycheck. Not only are proceeds of illegal 
activities being reinvested in the criminal organization that generated them, but 
it is estimated that each $1 billion that is laundered slows economic growth by 
roughly 0.05%-a statistic that, on its own, may seem insignificant, but that 
becomes a massive economic impediment when considering that an estimated 
$1.6 trillion (or 1600 billions) of criminal money was laundered in 2009.6 
Furthermore, injecting illicit funds into the lawful economic flow distorts 
appropriate prices and resource allocation, creates market volatility, and risks 
crowding out lawful businesses or investments. 7 
level criminals earn less than minimum wage. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. 
DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF 
EVERYTHING 92-93 (2d ed. 2006) (analyzing the monthly earnings of a Chicago 
street gang, and concluding that "foot soldiers" earned roughly $3.30 per hour). 
However, high-ranking persons in organized crime-including the Chicago street 
gang-earn much larger net gains while enjoying a much lower overall risk. Id. 
(stating that the Chicago street gang leader earned in excess of $8,500 per month). 
3 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (UNODC), ESTIMATING ILLICIT 
FINANCIAL FLOWS RESULTING FROM DRUG TRAFFICKING AND OTHER 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIMES: RESEARCH REPORT, 7 (Oct. 2011) 
[hereinafter UNO DC Report]. Unless otherwise specified, currency amounts listed 
are in USD. 
4 Id. at 10. 
5 See, e.g., Laundering of Monetary Instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012); 
Money Laundering F.A.Q., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/faq/moneylaundering/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015). 
6 UNODC Report, supra note 3, at 10-11 (taking into account decreased 
productivity in the workforce as a result of drug abuse, as well as costs of 
incarceration). It is important to note that money laundering on its own does not 
have a negative economic impact. Rather, because money laundering generally 
involves an influx of significant sums of currency, the initial impact of money 
laundering is economically positive. However, the actual laundering of money and 
the underlying criminal activities that generated the funds in need of laundering 
cannot be divorced when looking on a global scale. Furthermore, the economic 
benefit to countries complicit in money laundering is unsustainable, so the net 
economic impact of money laundering is overwhelmingly negative. Id. at 116-17. 
7 Id. at 109 (describing, in detail, ten main socioeconomic impacts of criminal 
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Casinos, as businesses that deal almost exclusively in cash transactions, are 
particularly vulnerable to money laundering activities.8 Accordingly, regulatory 
authorities in the U.S. and abroad have promulgated rules and reporting 
requirements in an attempt to track suspicious transactions and deter would-be 
money launderers from using casinos for their untoward ends.9 However, anti-
money laundering ("AML") regulations differ between countries, which can 
create problems for corporations operating casinos in multiple jurisdictions. 
Although there is an international group dedicated to the detection and 
prevention of money laundering-the Financial Action Task Force 
("FATF")10-there is not yet a uniform set of laws or means to enforce anti-
money laundering regulations across borders. 
This Note will look at the different AML regulations affecting casinos 
around the world, with an emphasis on the reporting requirements enacted in 
the United States and Macau. 11 Part II will provide a brief overview of federal 
U.S. legislation to prevent money laundering. Part III will discuss common 
schemes used by money launderers when attempting to circumvent these 
regulations. Part IV will briefly look at the regulatory compliance of U.S.-based 
gaming establishments located in other countries, focusing on the three 
Nevada-based companies currently operating casinos in Macau. Part V will 
discuss the AML framework in Macau, addressing various challenges specific 
to Macanese casino operators and regulators. Part VI will look to legislative 
AML efforts in other jurisdictions around the world, as well as the growing 
question of AML protocols with respect to online gambling. Finally, Part VII 
will propose a potential solution to the varied international policies and 
oversight of the gaming industry, and will suggest that an international 
legislative and regulatory authority would prevent criminals from exploiting the 
jurisdictional regulatory differences, and therefore could be the most effective 
money entering the legitimate system). 
8 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF)/ORG. FOR ECOI\f. Co-OPERATION AND 
DEV. (OECD) AND ASIA/PACIFIC GRP. ON MONEY LAUNDERING (APG), 
VULNERABILITIES OF CASINOS AND GAMING SECTOR 25 (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter 
FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT). 
9 See generally Steven Mark Levy, Exploiting Financial Institutions, FED. 
MONEY LAUNDERING (CCH) § 2.04 (FMNYL 2014) (discussing various money 
laundering tactics and applicable regulations enacted to protect financial 
institutions from being exploited). 
10 The F ATF promotes AML policies as well as policies designed to Combat 
the Financing of Terrorism ("CFT"), and generally refers to its recommendations as 
"AML/CFT." For more detailed infonnation about the FATF, see About Us, FIN. 
ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2014); see also infra Part VI. 
11 Macau can also be spelled "Macao." In the interest of simplicity, the 
spelling "Macau" will be used throughout this article, save for when a citation 
requires the alternate spelling. 
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way to combat money laundering in the world's casinos. 
II. THE UNITED STATES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In 2013, the Las Vegas Sands Corporation paid the U.S. government in 
excess of $4 7 million as part of a non-prosecution settlement. 12 In exchange for 
the Sands "returning" these millions of dollars to the U.S., the Justice 
Department agreed to end its criminal investigation of the Sands,13 and not seek 
an indictment for the Sands' failure to file Suspicious Activity Reports for 
Casinos and Card Clubs ("SAR-Cs") regarding millions of dollars wired to the 
Sands from Zhenly Ye Gon, a high-roller who was later arrested for his alleged 
role in a major drug trafficking operation. 14 Although $47 million is certainly a 
hefty fine, the amount of money gambled by Ye Gon is unclear and, the 
estimated amount of money that Ye Gon transferred to the Sands, it is certainly 
possible that the Sands nevertheless profited from his patronage. 15 
In the United States, casinos (including any other establishments, such as 
Las Vegas taverns, that have annual gaming revenue in excess of $1 million) 
are legally considered financial institutions. 16 This classification is, in due 
to casinos' unique ability to provide customers with a wide variety of services 
similar to those provided by a bank, such as cashing checks, extending credit, 
12 Alexandra Berzon & John R. Emshwiller, Sands, U.S. Reach Money· 
Laundering Accord, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2013, 7:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB l 0001424127887324906304579039264226544996. 
13 Id. The Las Vegas Sands Corp. operates the Venetian-Palazzo Hotel and 
Casino in Las Vegas, which was under investigation for failure to comply with the 
Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA"). For the purpose of simplicity, this article will refer to 
the parent corporation (the Sands) in lieu of the individual properties. For farther 
detail on the Sands investigation and settlement, see Press Release, U.S. Att'ys 
Office C.D, Cal., Operator of Venetian Resort in Las Vegas Agrees to Return Over 
$47 Million after Receiving Money under Suspicious Circumstances (Aug. 27, 
2013) [hereinafter DOJ/Sands Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
usao/cac/Pressroom/2013/11 0.html. 
14 See DOJ/Sands Press Release, supra note 13; Fuerst Ittleman David & 
Joseph, PL, Las Vegas Sands Casino Money Laundering Settlement a Bellwether 
for Future Cases, JDSUPRA LAW NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/las-vegas-sands-casino-money-laundering-29 511 I. 
15 See DOJ/Sands Press Release, supra note 13; Joseph Rillotta, Beyond the 
SAR-C: Best Practices for Gaming Companies to "Know Their Customer" and 
Avoid Organizational Money Laundering Liability in the Post-Sands Climate, 5 
UNLVGAMINGL.J.145, 146-51. 
16 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(X) (2012). Outside of the United States, many other 
jurisdictions and oversight bodies classify casinos as "Designated Non-Financial 
Business and Professions," or "DNFBP." However, many of the same AML 
regulations apply to financial institutions and DNFBPs alike. See generally FATF 
VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8. 
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and sending and receiving funds via wire transfer. 17 Therefore, as financial 
institutions, the U.S. government requires casinos within its regulatory 
jurisdiction to file SAR-Cs and Currency Transaction Reports ("CTRs"). 18 
Under current law, casinos must file CTRs whenever a customer gives or 
receives currency in excess of $10,000.19 This $10,000 threshold represents the 
aggregate of multiple transactions by the same customer during the same day; 
therefore, if a customer went to three different roulette tables and bought in for 
$3,500 each time, the aggregate amount of currency received by the casino 
from this customer would be $10,500 and a CTR would have to subsequently 
be filed.20 The filing of an SAR-C, however, is not necessarily contingent on 
any specific amount of money changing hands, and should be filed whenever a 
casino knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that a patron is engaged in 
illegal activity, or is attempting to evade reporting requirements.21 Casinos 
most frequently file SAR-Cs in situations similar to the one presented above, 
when they suspect patrons of "structuring"22 currency transactions in an effort 
to avoid triggering a CTR.23 
In part because of these filing requirements, U.S. casinos are an important 
source of information for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the 
Department of Treasury (FinCEN), and provide invaluable assistance to 
FinCEN's anti-money laundering efforts.24 But, as exhibited by the Sands' 
17 See Policies to Enforce the Bank Secrecy Act & Prevent Money Laundering 
in Money Services Bus. & the Gaming Industry: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Banking, Haus., & Urban Ajf., 108th Cong., at 63 (2004) (response to written 
questions of Senator Shelby from William J. Fox, Dir., Fin. Crimes Enforcement 
Network, U.S. Dept. of Treas.) [hereinafter BSA Hearing], available athttp://www. 
access.gpo.gov I congress/senate/senate05 sh.html. 
18 Rules for Casinos and Card Clubs: Filing Obligations 31 C.F.R. § 1021.311 
(2014); Reports by Casinos of Suspicious Transactions 31 C.F.R. § 1021.320 
(2014). 
19 31C.F.R.§1021.311. 
20 See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: 
TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES - IN Focus: THE CASINO AND GAMING INDUSTRY, at 10-
11 (May 2010) [hereinafter SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW]; Kathleen Gannon, Goodbye 
6A, Hello BSA, NEV. GAMING LAWYER, Sept. 2007, at 7. 
21 Macau and Hong Kong: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. 
Review Comm 'n, 113th Cong., at 51 (2013) (prepared statement of James H. Freis, 
Jr., Counsel, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Former Dir., U.S. Treasury 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) [hereinafter Macau Hearing], available at 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/USCC%20Hearing%20Tr 
anscript%20-%20June%2027%202013 .pdf. 
22 See infra Part III.A. 
23 BSA Hearing, supra note 17, at 66 (response to written questions of Sen. 
Shelby from William J. Fox). 
24 See id. at 54-55 (prepared statement of Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Pres. and 
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failure to comply with these reporting requirements25 and an earlier incident 
where the Mirage casino in Las Vegas failed to file roughly 14,000 CTRs,26 
these reporting requirements are not foolproof. 27 Even with these safeguards in 
place, it is still possible for casinos to be used as unwitting participants in 
money laundering schemes. Because casinos deal almost exclusively in cash 
and are able to provide patrons with cash services at all times, it is difficult to 
determine whether or not money is laundered through casinos in the U.S., and 
if so, how much money is laundered on an annual basis.28 
III. COMMON MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEMES 
Criminals often adapt to changing regulations that affect their enterprises; 
the world of money laundering is no different. It is a constant challenge for 
casinos and regulatory authorities to effectively implement changes of 
reporting requirements and oversight in order to combat resourceful money 
launderers. To better understand the challenges faced by casino operators 
around the world, it is useful to look at the activities that most commonly 
trigger casino employees to file SAR-Cs. 
A. Structuring 
The majority of SAR-Cs are filed in response to suspected structuring 
activities.29 Structuring is the process by which patrons of a casino attempt to 
avoid triggering a CTR by conducting multiple currency transactions with 
amounts lower than the CTR reporting threshold.30 Because casinos are 
CEO, Amer. Gaming Ass'n.). 
25 See generally DOJ/Sands Press Release, supra note 13. 
26 BSA Hearing, supra note 17, at 12 (testimony of William J. Fox). 
27 The Sands and the Mirage are not unique in their failure to comply with all 
aspects of U.S. reporting requirements. FinCEN has been increasingly vigorous in 
investigating, and fining, casinos for deficient compliance with AML regulations. 
See, e.g., Kate O'Keeffe, U.S. Fines Pacific Island Casino Operator $75 Million 
for Anti-Money-Laundering Violations, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2015, 6:14 AM), 
http://www. wsj. com/ articles/u-s-fines-pacific-island-casino-operator-7 5-million-for 
-anti-money-laundering-violations-1433412878; Howard Stutz, Caesars Facing 
Fine of Up to $20 Million to Settle Money Laundering Charges, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J. (May 12, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/casinos-
gaming/ caesars-facing-fine-20-million-settle-money-laundering-charges; Jonathan 
Stempel, Trump Taj Mahal Casino Settles U.S. Money Laundering Claims, 
REUTERS, Feb. 11, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/l 1/ 
trump-ent-trumptajmahal-moneylaundering-idUSLl NOVL2L 120150211. 
28 See BSA Hearing, supra note 17, at 26 (statement of Mr. Fahrenkopf). 
29 SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW, supra note 20, at 10. 
30 Id. See also Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirement 
Prohibited, 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2012). 
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supposed to file CTRs for any patron whose aggregate cash-in or cash-out is 
$10,000 or more, sometimes patrons suspected of structuring their transactions 
will enlist the help of agents in an attempt to avoid exceeding the personal 
$10,000 limit. 31 In this scenario, the structuring party will give each of his 
agents casino chips valuing less than $10,000 to exchange for cunency so that 
none of them will individually trigger a CTR.32 Furthermore, in an attempt to 
circumvent the casino filing a CTR based on aggregate currency transactions, 
criminals may track casino shift changes in the hopes of not being recognized 
as a patron who had bought in or cashed out earlier in the day. 33 
However, as casinos become more aware of structuring schemes, they also 
become more vigilant in looking for them and filing subsequent SAR-Cs. 
Although casinos are required to file SAR-Cs for any suspicious transactions 
involving $5,000 or more, casinos may also decide to voluntarily file SAR-Cs 
for suspicious activities involving smaller sums ofmoney.34 
B. Little or No Gambling Activity 
Structuring is only one type of transaction that raises red flags with casino 
personnel and compliance officers. Casino employees are also trained to 
recognize potential money laundering efforts when they see patrons buy-in for 
large amounts of currency-although generally less than the $10,000 that 
would trigger a CTR-but do not actually spend this money gambling.35 This 
is commonly referred to as "minimal gaming," the process by which a patron 
seeks to minimize his risk of loss by playing for a short amount of time, and/or 
making bets that are very small in comparison to the amount of his buy-in.36 
Patrons may also use the automated ticketing of slot machines in order to 
exchange small bills for large bills, which are easier to transport and conceal. 
For example: it would be wise for a casino to file a SAR-C if it observed a 
patron inserting a large number of small bills into a slot machine and engaging 
in minimal gaming before cashing out and redeeming the cash out voucher for 
large-denomination bills.37 
C. Comps and Other Fringe Benefits 
Casinos are particularly vulnerable targets for money launderers because of 
31 SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW, supra note 20, at l 0-11. 
32 Id. 
33 F ATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 59. 
34 BSA Hearing, supra note 17, at 66 (response to written questions of Sen. 
Shelby from William J. Fox). 
35 Id. at 66-67. 
36 SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW, supra note 20, at 9, 11-12. 
37 BSA Hearing, supra note 17, at 67 (response to written questions of Sen. 
Shelby from William J. Fox). 
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the casino industry's practice of giving gifts and to customers.38 These 
gifts, often called "comps," range from the mundane--such as free buffets for 
low-level players-to the extravagant-such as jet transportation to and 
from the casino, and free accommodations in the nicest suites the hotel has to 
offer. 39 Although these comps are usually used merely to foster goodwill and 
generate more business from recreational gamblers, patrons with an eye toward 
money laundering will sometimes ask that the more extravagant comps be 
given to their friends or traveling companions.40 Because many suspected 
money launderers bring a lot of money into the casino, it is likely that they are 
regarded as high-rollers, so asking for comps such as jewelry or vacation 
vouchers is not, in and of itself, extraordinary. However, when a high-roller 
asks that these comps be given to a friend or unrelated many U.S. casinos 
now recognize that as a potential warning sign of money laundering, and file a 
SAR-C in response.41 
IV. U.S.-BASED CASINO COMPLIANCE 
The Nevada Gaming Control Board has analyzed the AML efforts of 
casino operators who hold a Nevada gaming license, and has determined that 
casinos in the U.S. appear to be actively attempting to combat money 
laundering and potential terrorist financing by adhering to AML reporting 
requirements promulgated by FinCEN and the Nevada Gaming Commission.42 
But what of the casinos operated by U.S. corporations overseas? Nevada 
Gaming Control Board Chaimian A. G. Burnett says that, due to statutory 
requirements imposed upon Nevada-licensed gaming establishments that 
operate casinos outside of Nevada, Nevada-licensed casino operators, "offer 
robust compliance with anti-money laundering protocols" in both their 
domestic and foreign properties.43 However, he also acknowledges that this 
"robust compliance" is not without limits.44 
As of now, there are three major U.S. gaming corporations who have 
acquired licenses to operate in Macau: MGM Resorts International, the Las 
Vegas Sands Corporation, and Wynn Resorts Ltd.45 It is widely known that 
gaming in Macau has a long history of suspected ties to Asian Organized Crime 
38 See id. 
39 Id. See also How to Get Comps, CRUZINO, www.cruzino.com/free/comps. 
html (last visited May 3, 2015) (defining "comp" and providing examples). 
40 See BSA Hearing, supra note 17, at 67. 
41 Id. at 66-67. 
42 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 41 (prepared statement of A.G. Burnett, 
Chairman, Nev. Gaming Control Bd.). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at41-42. 
45 Tony Batt, Uncle Sam is Watching, MACAUBUSINESS.COM (July 22, 2013, 
5:30:56 PM), http://www.macaubusiness.com/news/uncle-sam-is-watching.html. 
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, more commonly known as "triads")46 , and the triads' presence is 
something that Macanese casino operators are still dealing with.47 The triads 
continue to run many of Macau's VIP rooms; rooms that account for the 
majority of casino revenue.48 U.S. gaming corporations operating casinos in 
Macau have a unique set of competing incentives: on the one hand, partnering 
with the triads to operate VIP rooms seems to be a necessary evil49 to woo 
high-rollers who might otherwise gamble at a different property; but on the 
other failure to abide by the regulatory laws of the Nevada Gaming 
Commission might endanger these corporations' licenses to operate in Las 
50 Vegas. 
V. MACAU 
Macau is currently the largest gaming industry in the world, reaping 
approximately $44 billion in casino revenue in 2014. 51 For the sake of 
perspective, Macau's 2014 gambling revenue was seven times the amount of 
2014 gambling revenue generated by the Las Vegas strip, and roughly four 
46 For more information on triads, and AOC in general, see Organized Crime: 
Asian Criminal Enterprises, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/ 
about-us/investigate/organizedcrime/asian (last visited June 11, 2015). 
47 See generally Macau Hearing, supra note 21 at 42 (discussing the 
suspected ties between Stanley Ho, the owner of a major casino conglomerate in 
Macau, and the triads, as well as the triads' direct involvement with VIP rooms in 
Macanese casinos). 
48 See Quarterly Gaming Statistics, Gaming Inspection and Coordination 
Bureau Macao SAR, http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/enJinformation/DadosEstat/2015 
/contenthtml#n3 (last visited June 11, 2015) (showing that VIP Baccarat accounted 
for more than half of the revenue from casino "games of fortune."). 
49 Hannah Dreier, Tiny Chinese Enclave Remakes Gambling World, 
Las Vegas, LAS VEGAS SUN (July 7, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news 
2013/jul/06/us-casinos-macau-headache-abridged ("Steve Vickers, who spent 18 
years in the Royal Hong Kong Police Force and commanded the its criminal 
intelligence bureau, believes that nearly all junkets that cater to Chinese tourists 
must tangle with organized crime."). 
50 Compare Macau Hearing, supra note 22, at 42 (prepared statement of A.G. 
Burnett, Chairman, Nev. Gaming Control Bd.), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.720 
(2014). As of the time of this writing, the Las Vegas Sands may be in danger of 
losing their Nevada gaming license because of their alleged ties to triads. See Carri 
Geer Thevenot, Judge Asked to Unseal Reports on Alleged Sands Ties to Macau 
Organized Crime, LAS VEGAS REv.-J. (June 9, 2015 4:57 PM), http://www.review 
journal.com/news/las-vegas/judge-asked-unseal-reports-alleged-sands-ties-macau-
organized-crime. 
51 Howard Stutz, Macau Casinos Start 2015 with Another Revenue Dip, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Feb. 2, 2015, 11:36 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/ 
casinos-gaming/macau-casinos-start-2015-another-revenue-dip. 
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times the amount of gaming revenue brought in by the entire state ofNevada.52 
Because there is so much money at stake, it is unsurprising that U.S. 
corporations-specifically the Sands, Wynn, and MGM-were eager to bid for 
gaming concessions from the Macanese government that allow these 
companies to operate casinos in Macau. 53 Unlike Las Vegas, which has 
increased the number of "family friendly" activities over the last two decades in 
an attempt to bolster tourism, the Macau tourist industry is focused primarily 
on gaming.54 However, the recent change in Chinese leadership has begun to 
crack down on corrnption55 -driving gaming revenue down and forcing 
casinos to increasingly mirror Las Vegas properties' non-gaming offerings.56 · 
But why is corruption such a large problem in Macau to begin with? 
To fully answer this question, it is necessa1y to m1derstand the structure of 
traditional Macanese casino operation, how that structure evolved, and the 
attendant challenges facing those who would change that structure to more 
effectively prevent money laundering. 
A. How Macanese Casinos Operate 
Casinos in Macau essentially operate two business models simultaneously: 
the traditional casino floor-designed for casual tourists and low-rollers; and 
the VIP rooms reserved for patrons looking to gamble large sums of money.57 
Although there is certainly potential for games on the main casino floor to be 
used as a means of "cleaning" dirty money, the sums wagered in VIP rooms 
52 Howard Stutz, Casino Revenue in Nevada, on the Strip Retreats Slightly in 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 30, 2015, 3:41 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/ 
business/ casinos-gaming/ casino-revenue-nevada-strip-retreats-slightly-14 (stating 
that Nevada's gaming revenue was $11 billion, and noting that the Strip brought in 
$6.37 billion in gaming revenue). 
53 Macau Hearing, supra note 22, at 39 (prepared statement of A.G. Burnett, 
Chairman, Nev. Gaming Control Bd.). 
54 See id. at 78 (testimony of A.G. Burnett). 
55 Stutz, supra note 51 ("Macau' s casino industry has suffered since June. A 
crackdown on corruption by the Chinese government has focused on junket 
operators who bring high-end baccarat gamblers to the casino's ultraexclusive 
private gambling rooms."). For a very comprehensive overview of how junkets 
operate, as well as the fallout from the Chinese government's crackdown on 
cormption, see Kate 0 'Keeffe, Junkets that Fuel Macau Casinos are on a Losing 
Streak, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2014, 10:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
junkets-that-fuel-macau-casinos-are-on-a-losing-streak-1411698784. 
56 Farah Master, Macau Casinos Seek Resort Cure for China Gambling 
Hangover, REUTERS, May 26, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
20 l 5/05/26/macau-diversification-idUSL3NOYC3P J20150526. 
57 Wuyi Wang & William R. Eadington, The VIP-Room Contractual System 
and Macao's Traditional Casino Industry, 6 CHINA: AN INT'L J. 237, 238 (2008). 
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and the VIP rooms' opaque operations58 make Macanese VIP rooms a more 
vulnerable target for money laundering transactions than the main floor. 59 
Generally speaking, a patron will not gain access to a VIP room unless he has a 
significant gambling budget, usually HK$500,000 or more. 60 In part due to this 
minimum monetary threshold, the VIP rooms generate roughly two-thirds of 
gaming revenue within Macanese casinos.61 VIP room operation, therefore, is 
essential to the financial well-being of both Macanese casinos and Macau as a 
62whole. 
B. VIP Rooms and Junket Operators 
The history of VIP room operation provides some insight as to why these 
rooms are the keystones of Macanese casino operation. Macau has been the 
center of gambling in Asia since the late 1800s, when Great Britain gained 
control over Hong Kong and criminalized gambling. 63 As Macau's population 
grew over the next century, so did its need for increased gaming revenue. 64 
Rather than invest resources in attempting to attract more mass-market casual 
gamblers, the Macanese casino operator, Stanley Ho,65 instead focused on 
58 See notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
59 See Jorge Godinho, The Prevention of Money Laundering in Macau 
Casinos, 17 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 262, 264-65 (2013); see also Wang & 
Eadington, supra note 56 at 239-45 (discussing the proliferation of VIP gaming in 
Macau). 
60 See Wang & Eadington, supra note 55, at 248. 
61 Stephanie Wong, Empty VIP Tables in Macau Means Trouble for $44 
Billion Industry, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:48 AM), http://www. 
bloomberg. com/news/ articles/2015-02-03 I empty-macau-vip-tab les-show-slide-in-
44-billion-industry. 
62 The successful operation of VIP gaming rooms directly affects the overall 
economy of Macau because the Macanese government taxes gross gambling 
revenues at a rate of nearly 40%. See Luis Pessanha, Gaming Taxation in Macau, 
12 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 344, 345 (2008). Furthermore, in 2011, money 
generated from gambling taxes accounted for 72% of the Macanese government's 
revenue. Macau Hearing, supra note 22, at 49 (prepared statement of James H. 
Preis, Counsel, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton). 
63 Wang & Eadington, supra note 57, at 239. Macau had previously been able 
to sustain itself economically as a trade hub, however, when Great Britain gained 
control of Hong Kong, Hong Kong became the central trading port for the region. 
Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Prior to 2002, Mr. Ho was the only licensed gaming operator in Macau. He 
held a monopoly for gaming from 1962 until 2002, and is still one of the most 
important and influential figures in Macanese gaming. Macau Hearing, supra note 
at 39 (prepared statement of A.G. Burnett). 
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cultivating a customer base.66 Rather than bear the costs 
of attracting new customers and bringing them to Mr. Ho subleased 
of his casinos to people who would bring in VIP customers. 67 
Today, these sublessees are commonly known as "junket or 
'~Munket "68 and they operate in much the same way did 
at their Junket operators essentially work for VIP room 
(often called "VIP promoters") and solicit business from 
"whales") such as wealthy businessmen and, occasionally, ~"'""'"~• governme
officials.69 Junket operators go to great lengths to form 
wealthy and assume the risks of all costs associated 
formation of the relationship-including paying the transportation costs 
the to Macau. 70 
The cultural differences between China and westernized regions are 
especially when it comes to forming business relationships. While W estem 
marketers utilize an array of psychologically-based techniques to woo wealthy 
stomers, 71 the Chinese place an emphasis on personal relationships as a basis 
for their business transactions.72 Accordingly, junket operators must invest 
66 Wang & Eadington, supra note at 240. 
67 In the 1970s and 80s, the ferries that transported gamblers between Hong 
Kong and Macau could not keep up with demand. Subsequently, entrepreneurial 
Macanese citizens began buying large quantities of ferry tickets to resell at prices 
much higher than face value. Stanley Ho owned both the casinos and the ferry 
company; therefore, ending feny ticket scalping was essential to the success of his 
enterprise. Accordingly, he enticed the ticket scalpers to stop interfering with the 
ferries by offering them the opportunity to conduct business in the casinos. Id. at 
241. See Angela Veng Mei Leong, The "Bate-Ficha" Business and Triads in 
Macau Casinos, 2 QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. & JUST. 1. 83, 84-85 (2002). 
68 "Junket Operator" and "Junket Promoter" are terms of art refe1Ting to the 
natural persons who develop relationships with high value gamblers and bring them 
to the casino. This is not to be confused with the term "VIP Promoter," which 
refers to the entity--whether legal person or natural-who contracts with the 
casino to run the VIP room. For a more detailed discussion about the different 
te1ms used in conjunction with Macanese VIP gaming, see Wang & Eadington, 
supra note 49, at 246-250. To avoid unnecessary confusion between the two terms, 
this note will use the phrase "junket operator(s)" when referring to the person 
responsible for recruiting the gambler. 
69 Wang & Eadington, supra note 55, at 247-50. 
70 Id. at 247--48. 
71 See generally MaryLou Costa, Reaching Wealthy Consumers Demands 
Classic Luxury Marketing Techniques, MARKETING WEEK (Feb. l, 2012), 
www.marketingweek.co. uk/reaching-wealthy-consumers-demands- classic-luxury-
marketing-techniques/3033733. article (discussing the most effective tactics for 
business from wealthy customers). 
72 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 79 (testimony of I. Nelson Rose, 
Professor of Law, Whittier Law Sch. & the Univ. of Mac.). 
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significant amounts of time and resources into each gambler seek to 
recruit. The process of VIP recruitment is sometimes referred to 
making," because the junket operators the importance of 
a strong interpersonal relationship with the gambler. 73 
Once a junket operator has established a reiationship with a high stakes 
gambler, the junket operator will usually suggest a trip to Macau at no cost to 
the gambler.74 Once in Macau, the gambler will be ushered into a VIP room nm 
by the junket operator and his associates. 75 At this point, junket operators will 
usually offer to advance VIP gamblers large sums of money in the form of 
"dead chips," which have no redemption value and can be used for 
gambling.76 When the dead chips are gambled, the are paid in "live 
" which are casino chips that can be turned in for cash.77 However, the 
junket operator earns a commission off of the amount of dead chips wagered by 
the VIP gambler, so the VIP gambler will often be encouraged to convert his 
live winnings into dead chips so his "friend"-the junket operator-can earn 
more money.78 This is referred to as "chip rolling."79 In some cases, the junket 
operator will incentivize the gambler chip roll by selling the gambler dead 
chips at a discount, or giving the gambler a portion of the dead chip 
commission. 80 However, if a triad is involved with the VIP room operation, 
they will likely force the gambler to roll his chips if he does not do so 
illi 1 81 Wl mgy. 
The dead chip transactions are the epicenter of money laundering activities 
within Macanese casinos. This is because Chinese law restricts anyone from 
Mainland China from taking more than 20,000 Yuan (roughly $3,150) in cash 
out of the Mainland, which is the main feeder of gamblers to Macau.82 Given 
that junket operators generally receive a commission based on dead chip play, 
it is clear that the incentives for junket operators to encourage the VIPs to 
gamble large sums of money are high.83 Since all parties involved-the junket 
operators, the casinos, and the VIPs-want the VIPs to have access to 
significant amounts of money, the question necessarily arises: how does one get 
this money to a VIP gambler in the face of such stringent currency restrictions? 
73 See id. For more detailed information about the "friend making" process, 
see Wang & Eadington, supra note 57, at 247-48. 
74 Wang & Eadington, supra note 57, at 248. 
15 Id. 
76 Id. at 248, 251. 
77 Id. at 244, 249. 
78 Id. at 243. 
19 Id. 
80 Id. at 243 n.15. 
81 Leong, supra note 67, at 90. 
82 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 60 (prepared statement of Prof. Rose). 
83 Godinho, supra note 59, at 264 n.18. 
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C. Funding VIP Gamblers 
Unsurprisingly, the easiest way of circumventing this currency restriction 
is through the dead chip dealing in the VIP rooms. In 2004, Macau passed a 
law-Law 5/2004-that permitted junket operators, as well as the casinos 
themselves, to extend credit to gamblers. 84 Accordingly, the junket operators 
may lawfully advance an interest-free loan to the VIP gambler in any amount 
they wish, which-similar to a traditional "marker" issued by U.S. casinos-
the gambler can immediately repay from his winnings, or pay back after 
leaving Macau if his gambling is unsuccessful. 85 The gambler here is not 
violating Chinese currency restrictions because he is not carrying any currency. 
Although this may seem innocuous, and indeed may be used by gamblers 
and VIP rooms dealing only with legitimate funds, the potential for laundering 
money through the Macanese VIP rooms is high. Ordinarily, if a gambler seeks 
to make a transaction involving a large amount of money, casinos are required 
to create and maintain records of a gambler's identity and the source of the 
gambler's funds; this information gathering process is called "customer due 
diligence," and is standard operating procedure for any business subject to 
AML regulation.86 However, the VIP rooms are not subject to the same 
scrutiny as the main casino floor, thereby allowing players to wager huge sums 
of money without leaving a paper trail. 87 Rather than risk conviction for 
violating the Chinese currency restrictions, or risk triggering the creation and 
filing of "due diligence reports," an unscrupulous gambler from the Mainland 
can work with a Macanese junket operator to wash huge sums of illicit money 
under the cover of the VIP room. 88 
The 2009 FATF report analyzing money-laundering threats specifically 
faced by casinos details a common scenario for gamblers using junket operators 
to circumvent Chinese currency restrictions: 
A merchant in country A could not perform a large remittance to 
country B due to its foreign exchange control. With the help of a 
84 Jorge A. F. Godinho, Credit for Gaming in Macau, 10 GAMING L. REV. 
363, 363, 367 (2006). See also Jorge Godinho, Should Credit Agreements Between 
Casinos and Patrons Be Subject to Prior Government Approval? A Note on Wynn 
Resorts (Macau) S.A. v. Mong Henry, 14 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 541 (2010) 
(discussing Law 5/2004 in further detail). 
85 See Wang & Eadington, supra note 57, at 246, 248. 
86 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, lNT'L STDS. ON COMBATING MONEY 
LAUNDERING & THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF 
RECOMMENDATIONS, Recommendation 22, at 19 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter FATF, 40 
RECOMMENDATIONS] (incorporating Recommendation IO-procedures for 
customer due diligence-against casinos), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/F ATF _ Recommendations.pdf. 
87 See generally FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 49-50. 
88 Id. at 50. 
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junket promoter, he transfe1Ted the monies to the VIP room of a 
local casino, which informed an underground remitter in country B 
about the amount and beneficiary of the funds. The remitter would 
then arrange payment of the fund to the beneficiary. For country B 
citizens who wished to gamble in this casino of country A, but had 
difficulty in bringing in the cash, they would arrange alternative 
remittance through this remitter who would then inform details of 
these customers to the VIP room. When these citizens arrived at the 
VIP room they could immediately obtain the amount required for 
gambling. Both the VIP room and the remitter would perform 
reconciliation for net settlement, and basically no transfer of monies 
b .d . d 89 etween two s1 es was reqmre . 
95 
This example shows the typical way that junket operators work to get VIP 
patrons money needed to gamble at Macanese casinos. 
There are many other innovative ways that gamblers from Mainland 
China-VIPs and low-rollers alike-get around the currency restrictions. 
Gamblers may bring jewelry or other valuables into Macau and sell them upon 
arrival.90 Presently, one of the most common schemes to circumvent the 
currency restriction is through the use of credit cards: a gambler arriving in 
Macau will ostensibly purchase a high-value item using his credit card, but will 
be given the cash equivalent of the item, minus a lender's fee, instead of the 
merchandise.91 
Rather than go through this subterfuge, under Law 5/2004, a patron could 
receive a line of credit directly from the casino.92 However, the main casino 
operators are much more likely to follow AML procedures than junket 
operators, because casinos are subject to more rigorous oversight and 
regulation.93 Subsequently, patrons who seek to conceal the source or amounts 
of their funds will generally opt to use the more discreet, and perhaps less 
legitimate, junket operators. Patrons and junket operators can further conceal 
the amounts of their transactions through prior arrangements that allow the 
patrons to make symbolic bets lower than the amount actually being risked.94 
To wit, a gambler may publically make bets of 100 Yuan, but have a prior 
agreement with a junket operator in which each 100 Yuan bet represents an 
89 Id. at 50-51. 
90 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 61 (prepared statement of Prof. Rose). 
91 Id. 
92 FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 49; Godinho, supra note 
59, at 264-265. 
93 See Christopher Palmeri & Vinicy Chan, Sands Said to Step up Scrutiny of 
Casino Junkets in Macau, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Apr. 4, 2014, 9:44 AM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-04/sands-steps-up-scrutiny-of-casino-
junkets-in-macau. 
94 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 62-63 (prepared statement of Prof. 
Rose). 
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actual amount of 10,000 Yuan. 95 This kind of prior arrangement allows the 
gambler to engage in high-stakes wagering without triggering the attendant 
AML scmtiny. 
It is difficult to know what, exactly, Macanese AML protocols are because 
the instructions and regulations promulgated by the Macanese Gaming 
Inspection and Coordination Bureau ("DICJ"96) are generally not made 
public.97 There are many duties of confidentiality under the laws of Macau, 
most notably due to the Macanese Privacy Act 8/2005, which effectively 
prevents businesses from disclosing infonnation about individuals to foreign 
entities.98 The strict privacy laws of Macau also prevent the divulgence of 
documents produced as part of a contractual relationship absent an express 
authorization from the affected party permitting the disclosure.99 These privacy 
laws create a veil under which VIP junket operators and VIP patrons can 
operate with impunity, because it is difficult-if not impossible-for outside 
authorities or regulatory bodies to tmly know what goes on in the VIP rooms. 
None of this is to suggest that Macau does not have AML laws and 
protocols in place. Similar to casinos in the U.S., the DICJ requires Macanese 
casinos to file Suspicious Activity Reports and Cunency Transaction 
Reports. 100 However, the Macanese regulations are facially less stringent than 
their U.S. counterparts, to wit, the amount of currency necessary to trigger a 
CTR in Macau is $62,500,101 more than six times the amount that triggers a 
CTR in the United States. 102 Furthermore, it appears that the Macanese privacy 
laws create a shroud of secrecy around the VIP rooms, under which the 
operators and gamblers can sidestep AML regulations with a fairly low risk of 
consequence. In the face of the massive revenue generated by VIP gamblers 
that the junket operators recruit, it is easy to understand why Macanese casino 
operators do not seem to be rushing to implement more stringent oversight over 
VIP room operations. As noted earlier, VIP gaming revenue was approximately 
$26.4 billion in 20 l 4. 103 It would be foolhardy to expect casinos to risk their 
market shares of this hefty sum by cracking down on junket operators and VIP 
rooms whose practices may not comport with AML regulations. 
95 See id. 
96 The official name of the DICJ is the "Direccao de Inspeccao e Coordenacao 
de Jogos." Godhino, supra note 84, at 542 n.4. 
97 Godinho, supra note 59, at 268. 
98 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 43 (prepared statement of A.G. Burnett). 
99 Godinho, supra note 59, at 268 n.47. 
100 lvfacau Hearing, supra note 21, at 54 (Prepared statement of Mr. Freis). 
101 Id. 
102 The U.S. threshold is $10,000. See supra note 19, and accompanying text. 
103 Wong, supra note 61 ("High-end players [] last year contributed 60 percent 
of the $44 billion casino revenue to the Chinese city."). 
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D. VlP Room Operators 
Until now, the focus of this note has been on the players and 
operators, however the actual entities in control of the VIP rooms are a 
potential channel through which money can be laundered. There is a 
history of triad-run VIP rooms in Macau, 104 in part because gambling debts are 
not enforceable in China. 105 Triad involvement was initially a way for a VIP 
promoter to ensure payment of debts, since triads by definition conducted their 
business outside the law. 106 As VIP rooms became more profitable, the triads 
moved away from their role as enforcement agents to become VIP promoters 
thernselves. 107 Now, although Macau has instituted stricter licensing procedures 
for VIP promoters and junket operators, 108 many VIP rooms are still linked to 
triads. 109 By operating VIP rooms, triads have the opportunity to wash large 
sums of money under the guise of an extremely profitable legitimate business. 
Take, for example, the Iao Kun Group-a sizeable holding company whose 
subsidiaries operate numerous VIP rooms110 -which is traded on the NASDAQ 
stock exchange under the symbol IKGH. 111 IKGH operates VIP rooms in five 
Macau casinos, and reported a "rolling chip turnover" of approximately $16.6 
billion for 2014. 112 In order to realize this amount of dead chip rolling, IKGH 
must have a significant amount of capital to invest in its VIP rooms, because 
operating a VIP room requires the room owner deposit a large sum of money 
104 Leong, supra note 67, at 89. 
105 Godinho, supra note 59, at 265 n.25. 
106 Leong, supra note 67, at 94. 
107 See Wang & Eadington, supra note 57, at 240-41. 
108 Vinicy Chan, Macau to Strengthen Casino Junket Licensing System, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:21 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2013-02-07 /macau··to-strengthen-casino-junket-licensing-system.html. 
109 See Thevenot, supra note 50. 
110 "IKGH is a holding company which operates through its subsidiaries and 
related promotion entities that act as VIP room gaming promoters . . . and is 
entitled to receive all of the profits of the VIP gaming promoters , , . from VIP 
gaming rooms." Investor Relations, IAO KUN GROUP HOLDING LTD., http:// 
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150305005256/en/Iao-Kun-Group-Holding-
Company-Limited-Announces#.VQjUfOaSJpk (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
111 Id. The use of IKGH in this note is in no way meant to insinuate that IKGH 
does not comply with AML regulations, has ties to triads, or operates in any 
manner that is not entirely legal. Rather, IKGH is used merely to give a concrete 
example of a highly successful VIP room operator to demonstrate to the reader how 
the VIP rooms could potentially be used for money laundering purposes. 
112 Press Release, IKGH, Iao Kun Group Holding Company Limited 
Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2014 Financial Results (Apr. 1, 2015), 
available at http://ir.ikghcl.com/releasedetail.cfm ?ReleaseID=904408. 
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with the casino in exchange for dead chips. 113 This capital has to come from 
somewhere, and potentially presents a perfect opportunity to launder illicit 
money through a seemingly legitimate investment. 
If a criminal wanted to launder money through a Macanese VIP room, he 
could either create a corporation like IKGH or make a large investment in an 
existing company using illegitimate funds, thereby becoming a shareholder. 
Like other money laundering schemes, once he makes his initial investment, 
the criminal can attribute money earned from his illegitimate business to the 
legitimate funds generated by the VIP room. This scenario assumes that the 
VIP promoter is not complicit in the money-laundering scheme. If, however, 
the VIP promoter is a party to the criminal activity, the potential for laundering 
illicit funds becomes exponentially greater. 
To get an idea of how this might work, and just how much money is 
involved, one can look to IKGH's 6-K filing for May 2015. 114 IKGH's 6-K 
lists its total VIP gaming revenues for the three months ending March 31, 2015 
as approximately $41 million, with expenses totaling nearly $3 7 million. 115 If a 
VIP room dealing with this amount of currency was operated by a triad or its 
affiliates, large sums of money from the triad's illegal activities-such as drug 
dealing, loan sharking, and prostitution-could be claimed as legitimate 
gaming revenue for the VIP room. This laundering scheme would also give the 
triad the opportunity to pay its members in legitimate funds, such as by paying 
them under "commissions to agents," a line item that cost IKGH nearly $28 
million. 116 Given the levels of confidentiality surrounding Macanese VIP 
rooms, it would be easy for a triad, or other criminal body, to filter illegitimate 
funds through a VIP room that they controlled. 
E. Licensing, Regulation, and Obstacles 
Unlike their foreign counterparts, the Nevada-based casino operators-
Wynn, Sands, and MGM-are required to comply with Nevada gaming 
regulations, regardless of where their respective casinos are located. 117 Under 
Nevada law, a casino's Nevada gaming license can be revoked if it 
"knowingly. . . [f]ail[s] to conduct the [foreign gaming] operation in 
113 See Wang & Earlington, supra note 57, at 254 (detailing and diagramming 
the numerous transactions among the casino, the VIP room operator, the junket 
operator, and the VIP gambler). 
114 Iao Kun Grp. Holding Co., Ltd., Report of Foreign Issuer (Form 6-K), (May 
29, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1417754/00011442 
0415034446/v411887_6k.htm. As noted earlier, the use of IKGH's 6-K is not 
meant to implicate them in any money laundering activities, but is solely intended 
to quantitatively illustrate how vulnerable VIP rooms are to laundering schemes. 
115 Id. at 3. 
116 Id. 
117 NEV. REV. STAT.§ 463.720 (2014). See also supra Part IV. 
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accordance with the standards of honesty and integrity required for gaming in 
[Nevada]." 118 Accordingly, if any of the three U.S.-based companies failed to 
report high-value currency transactions or suspicious activity occurring in their 
Macanese properties, they would be placing their license to operate their Las 
Vegas properties in jeopardy.119 However, the VIP room structure gives U.S.-
based gaming corporations the potential to comply with the letter of the Nevada 
law, while sidestepping compliance with the law's spirit and intent: the Nevada 
licensee can only be held responsible for its own transactions, and can therefore 
avoid liability for insufficient AML procedures implemented by the VIP room 
operators. 120 In fact, the Nevada Gaming Commission acknowledges that its 
authority to regulate Nevada licensees operating in Macau extends only to the 
entrance of the VIP room; the VIP room operator assumes control and 
responsibility for all transactions occurring inside the VIP room itself. 121 As 
long as the Nevada licensee takes appropriate precautions, follows all 
applicable due diligence and reporting requirements, and properly conducts its 
transactions with the VIP room operator, the licensee is not risking its Nevada 
license. 122 
The very nature of VIP rooms and junket operators contradicts traditional 
notions of AML procedures; a significant portion of AML regulations involve 
"know your customer" protocols, which involve verifying the identity of 
patrons as well as taking steps to reasonably ensure the source of their funds is 
legitimate. 123 However, since many VIP gamblers are brought to Macau after 
developing a relationship with a junket operator, 124 it would seem unnecessary 
and redundant for the VIP room operator and the host casino to vet the gambler 
upon his arrival. Unfortunately, foregoing customer and fund identification 
procedures assumes that the junket operator has performed appropriate 
customer due diligence before recruiting the VIP gambler, an assumption 
that-given the amount of commission money at stake125 -may be woefully 
118 NEV. REV. STAT.§ 463.720(2). 
!!9 See Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 72 (testimony of A.G. Burnett) 
(stating that foreign properties of Nevada licensees must comply with Nevada 
regulations, FinCEN and IRS requirements, and any local laws); see also Thevenot, 
supra note 50. 
120 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 40-41 (prepared statement of A.G. 
Burnett). 
145. 
121 Id. at41. 
i22 Id. 
123 Id. at 45--46 (opening statement of Mr. Freis); Rillotta, supra note 15, at 
124 See Wang & Eadington, supra note 57, at 247--48. 
125 For example, the IKGH 6-K filing line item "commission to junket agents" 
totaled nearly $28 million for the three-month period ending in March 2015. IKGH 
6-K filing, supra note 114, at 3. 
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inaccurate. Even casinos in jurisdictions that require junket operators to be 
licensed are vulnerable to unknowingly laundering money through VIP rooms; 
licensed junket operators may "front" for less-scrupulous third-parties who 
would not qualify for licensure themselves.126 
Starting in 2002, and coinciding with the end of Stanley Ho's casino 
monopoly, the Macanese government began implementing procedures to 
regulate and license junket operators and VIP promoters.127 These licensing 
procedures-collectively referred to as the "Junket Operator Regulation"-
require a junket operator seeking licensure to divulge significant amounts of 
personal information to the DICJ. 128 However, the regulation contains no 
information about how this information will be used to determine an 
applicant's qualifications, and there is no express criteria requiring a 
background check or fingerprinting. 129 
After the enactment of the Junket Operator Regulation in 2002, 130 there 
was a significant decrease in VIP Baccarat play, which coincided with a near 
doubling of mass-market baccarat play. 131 It is likely, as one scholar suggests, 
that this shift in play was the result of casinos luring low- and middle-end VIP 
gamblers out of the VIP rooms and onto the main casino floor to maintain 
gaming revenue while limiting the annual fee payable to the Macanese 
govemment. 132 However, there is another, less-legitimate, possibility for such a 
significant shift in gaming activity: in response to stricter licensing 
requirements, junket operators with established relationships with VIP 
gamblers may have moved their business to the main casino floor after making 
prior arrangements with gamblers regarding the actual and symbolic value of 
their bets. 133 
Since opening Macau's gaming market to foreign entities, Macanese 
lawmakers have passed more regulations governing junket operators and VIP 
126 F ATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 50. 
127 Ricardo C. S. Siu, Formal Rules, Iriformal Constraints, and Industrial 
Evolution - The Case of the Junket Operator Regulation and the Transition of 
Macao's Casino Business, 11 UNL V GAMING RESEARCH & REV. J. 49, 53 (2007). 
128 Id. 
129 Id 
130 The Junket Operator Regulation was promulgated in 2002, however it was 
not enforced until mid-2005. This was to "minimize the possible shock" to the 
gaming sector, and allow junket operators to continue their business while 
concurrently preparing, submitting and awaiting approval of their license 
applications. Id. at 54. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 55; see also Pessanha, supra note 62, at 346 (detailing the per table 
premium fee assessed by the Macanese government). 
133 For a more detailed discussion of the symbolic bet scheme, see supra note 
95, and accompanying text. 
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promoters, and appear to have enacted stricter procedures for the prevention of 
money laundering. 134 Although these laws and regulations are promising signs 
of increased A.ML procedures for Macanese casinos, it is impossible to know 
how well these regulations are working, or how strictly they are being enforced. 
The Nevada Gaming Commission periodically audits the Macanese properties 
of the three Nevada-licensees to ensure compliance with Nevada and U.S. 
foderal regulations, however they have no authority to investigate the VIP 
promoters or junket operators, or casinos that have no ties to Nevada. 135 The 
most thorough and comprehensive review of AML procedures and enforcement 
in Macau is called a "Mutual Evaluation Report," which is conducted by the 
F ATF in conjunction with the local F ATF-Style Regional Bodies ("FSRBs"). 136 
Mutual Evaluation Reports examine both "technical compliance" with the 
F ATF Anti-Money Laundering Recommendations, and the "effectiveness" of a 
country's implementation of AML legislation and procedures. 137 
When the last Mutual Evaluation Report of Macau was conducted in 2006, 
evaluators were unable to determine if Macanese AML laws were being 
enforced effectively, because many of the regulations had been newly 
enacted. 138 Although the 2006 Report indicated that Macau was actively 
moving towards a more comprehensive A.ML framework, the Report also 
identified major deficiencies in the gaming sector, especially the need to lower 
the threshold for triggering a currency transaction repo1i, and the need to 
implement compliance reviews of the casinos. 139 The next Mutual Evaluation 
Report of Macau is scheduled to take place at the end of 2016, and will 
134 See generally Siu, supra note 127; _Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 10 
(discussing the AML procedures enacted shortly before 2006). 
135 See supra Part IV. 
136 See Mutual Evaluations, APG, http://www.apgml.org/mutual-evaluations/ 
page.aspx?p=a90 l 7 l 2a-54e4-4b3b-al 46-046aefca6534 (last visited June 12, 2015). 
137 Procedures the FATF Fourth Round of AMLICFT Mutual Evaluations, 
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/docu 
ments/4th-round-procedures.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2014). 
138 ASIA/PACIFIC GROUP ON MONEY LAUNDERING (APG) & OFFSHORE GROUP 
OF BANKING SUPERVISORS (OGBS), APG/OGBS MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT 
ON MACAO, CHINA AGAINST THE FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS (2003) & 9 
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, at 7-8 (adopted July 24, 2007) [hereinafter 2006 
REPORT], available at http://www.apgml.org/documents/Default.aspx?pcPage=l l 
("In respect of the oversight and regulatory responsibilities delegated to the DICJ, 
the implementation of recently issued guidelines and instructions cannot be 
assessed at this time. In addition, no comprehensive risk assessment seems to have 
been undertaken within the casino sector specifically to assess the risk of [money 
laundering] or [the financing of terrorism]."). 
139 Id. at 155. See also Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 10 (opening 
statement of Mr. Daniel Glaser, Asst. Sec'y for Terrorist Fin., Office of Terrorism 
& Fin. Intelligence, Treas. Dept.). 
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hopefully be able to offer more extensive analysis of the AML regulations, and 
enforcement thereof, in the gaming sector. 140 The 2016 Mutual Evaluation 
Report will be an impmiant source of AML information, because although 
Macau has created legislation and policies to more effectively regulate casinos, 
junket operators, and VIP promoters, the veil of secrecy surrounding the VIP 
rooms still leaves Macanese casinos vulnerable to money laundering activities. 
VI. REGULATIONS IN OTHER REGIONS 
Currently, there is no international body governing the creation of, or 
adherence to, AML regulations. The closest thing to an international oversight 
and enforcement agency is the FATF: an inter-governmental agency created by 
the United Nations, that promulgates recommendations for AML measures in 
the hopes of eventually creating a universal standard for AML procedures for 
both financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions ("DNFBPs"). 141 The F ATF is comprised of 36 members and 8 
FSRBs, which aggregately represent a significant portion of the world. 142 
However, although instrumental in the fight against money laundering, the 
F ATF has no authority to implement AML regulations, nor does it have the 
authority to sanction or otherwise penalize non-compliant entities or 
jurisdictions.143 Simply put, although the F ATF publishes recommendations 
that are considered to set the standard in AML protocols, the F ATF is beholden 
to the political will of individual countries, and can do little more than 
disseminate information about which jurisdictions are more compliant with 
FATF recommendations than others.144 This list of "High Risk and Non-
Cooperative Jurisdictions" serves to dissuade legitimate businesses and 
140 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, GLOBAL ASSESSMENTS' CALENDAR, at 2, 
available at http://www. fatf-gafi. org/media/fatf/ docmnents/ assessments/Global-
assessment-calendar. pdf. 
141 About Us, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note l 0. 
142 For a detailed list of countries represented in the 36 FATF members, as 
well as information about the 8 FSRBs, see Countries, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ (last visited June 12, 2015). 
143 About Us, Fm. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 10; see also F.A.Q., Fm. 
ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/faq/moneylaundering/ (last 
visited May 3, 2015). 
144 The FA TF maintains and periodically releases a list of jurisdictions 
identified as having "strategic AML/CFT deficiencies." FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 
IMPROVING GLOBAL AML/CFT COMPLIANCE: ON-GOING PROCESS-HIGH-RISK & 
NON-COOPERATIVE JURISDICTIONS, Oct. 18, 2013 [hereinafter FATF HIGH-RISK 
JURISDICTIONS], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/ 
statements/Compliance-18-0ctober-2013 .pdf. When a jurisdiction is placed on this 
list, the FATF will seek a commitment from high-level political officials to work 
with the F ATF and increase AML precautions. 
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governmental bodies from conducting transactions with jurisdictions listed as 
non-compliant. However, this list may also inadvertently alert criminals to 
areas that will not be hostile towards their money laundering efforts. 
A. Well-Regulated Gaming Sectors 
The European Union has one of the most comprehensive sets of AML 
requirements for financial institutions and DNFBP. 145 Directive 2005/60/EC 
requires that casinos verify the identity of patrons buying or redeeming chips 
worth 2000EUR or more, or otherwise "register, identify and verify the identity 
of their customers immediately on or before entry."146 In some respects, these 
regulations are more stringent than those imposed upon U.S. casinos, because 
the BSA currency threshold is $10,000 or just under 8900EUR. 147 To think of it 
conversely, ifthe U.S. reporting requirement was as stringent as that set forth in 
Directive 2005/60/EC, casinos would have to file CTRs for any transaction 
involving roughly $2250. 148 
Each of the Member States of the EU have individual AML regulations and 
oversight bodies. For example, the United Kingdom incorporated the 
provisions of Directive 2005/60/EC into their legislation through the Money 
Laundering Regulations of 2007. 149 The Money Laundering Regulations vest 
authority for casino supervision in the Gambling Commission. 150 The 
Gambling Commission is allowed to enter and inspect casino premises without 
a warrant, interrogate any person on premises, take anything reasonably 
believed to be used in connection with money laundering, and conduct 
undercover "test purchases" to ensure that: (a) casinos have adequate AML 
protocols in place, and (b) casino employees-especially those involved with 
currency transactions-are properly complying with the applicable AML 
145 See Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 Oct. 2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose 
of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0015:0036 
:en:PDF. 
146 Id. art. 10, at 24. 
147 See Rules for Casinos and Card Clubs, 31 C.F.R. § 1021.311 (2014). At the 
time of this writing, the exchange rate was lUSD = 0.8873EUR. US DOLLAR-
EURO Exchange Rate, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ 
USDEUR:CUR/chart. To easily convert USD to EUR, or vice versa, see Currency 
Converter, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/currencies/ 
currency-converter/. 
148 Currency Converter, supra note 147. 
149 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, Explanatory 
Note (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007 /2157 /made/data. 
pdf. 
150 Id. pt. 4, 23(1)(e). 
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d 151 If l . ff . h . b . proce ures. t1ere is suficient reason to suspect that money is emg 
laundered through a casino, the Gambling Commission will submit a report to 
the National Crime Agency, who, in tum, can bring criminal charges 
those involved in the money laundering operation. 152 Imbuing the Gambling 
Commission with such broad authority has been instrumental in the United 
Kingdom's ability to effectively combat money laundering, and is reflective of 
similar oversight schemes across the European Union Member States. 153 
Australian casinos, like those in the U.S. and European 
to strict requirements, governed by the Anti-Money and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 ("AML/CTF 154 Under the 
AML/CTF Act, casinos are required to submit a Threshold Transaction Report 
("TTR") to AUSTRAC 155 and positively identify customers who or win 
1 0,000AUD or more, as well as submit reports of suspicious transactions, 
of the value of the transaction. 156 Similar to the structures 
found in the U.S. and the EU--although AUSTRAC is the Financial 
Intelligence Unit ("FIU") for Australia as a whole--each state and 
5, 38; GAMBLJNG COMMISSION, Anti-Money Laundering: 
to 6 [hereinafter Approach to 
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/ Anti-money laundering -
supervision - April 2013.pdf 
152 See Approach to Supervision, supra note 151, at 1; The National Crime 
Agency-formerly known as the Serious Organised Crime Agency ("SOCA")-is 
a "non-ministerial government department .... subject to external and 
independent scrutiny." How We Are Run, NAT'L CRIME AGENCY, http://www. 
nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/how-we-are-rnn (last visited June 2015). 
153 See generally Final Study on the Application of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive, DELOITTE & THE EUROPEAN COMM'N 135-139, (2009) (comparing how 
different European Member States monitor the effectiveness of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive). 
154 The Anti-Money Laundering & Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 
(Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter 2006 AML/CTF Act], available at http://www.comlaw. 
gov.au/Details/C2015C00064. AML requirements were initially set forth in the 
Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 ("FTR Act"), however the majority of the 
FTR Act's obligations were incorporated into the AML/CTF Act. See Introduction 
to AMLICTF, AUSTRAC E-LEARNING, http://www.austrac.gov.au/eleaming/intro_~ 
amlctf_legislation.html (last visited June 12, 2015). 
155 AUSTRAC stands for "Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre," and is Australia's anti-money laundering regulator and financial 
intelligence unit. About AUSTRAC, AUSTL. TRANSACTION REP. & ANALYSIS 
CENTRE, http://www.austrac.gov.au/about-us/austrac (last visited June 12, 2015). 
For more complete information about AUSTRAC, see AUSTRAC Service Charter, 
AUSTL. TRANSACTION REP. & ANALYSIS CENTRE, http://www.austrac.gov.au/ 
servicecharter.html (last visited June 12, 2015). 
156 2006 AML/CFT Act, supra note 154 (Cth) pt 1(6)(4), pt 3 div 3 (Aust!.). 
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within Australia has its own casino licensing and regulatory bodies. 157 
Australia has also enacted specific procedures to regulate and license 
junket operators. 158 Although licensing junket operators is an important 
component of combatting money laundering through casinos, it is important to 
remember that, merely licensing junket operators may not prevent them from 
being agents of money laundering schemes. 159 Therefore, Australia's licensing 
require that junket operators function differently than do those in 
Macau. This provides a robust defense to money laundering because the role of 
Australian operators is more akin to travel agents, who organize 
gambling holidays that comply with the extensive requirements of the 
AML/CTF Act, rather than recruiting wealthy VIP gamblers with the lure of 
almost total anonymity. 160 
In addition to Australian-based AML protocols, one of Australia's 
gaming companies-Crown Resorts Limited ("Crown")-adheres to the 
regulations of the Nevada Gaming Commission because of Crown's ties to Las 
casinos and casino operators. 161 In late 2013, the Nevada Gaming 
Commission approved a number of Crown's "Applications for Findings of 
Suitability as Managers and Directors," further cementing Crown's need to 
comport with Nevada AML regulations. 162 Currently, Crown operates 
hotel/casinos in Australia, Macau, and London. 163 In order to keep its affiliation 
with Nevada-based casinos intact, Crown and its officers have to abide by the 
Nevada regulations as well as Australian AML laws and any requirements of 
the jurisdictions in which their casinos are physically located. 164 
157 FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 16. 
158 Id. at 49. 
159 Even vetted and licensed junket operators can be used as "fronts" for 
operators who would not qualify for licensure themselves. See supra Part V.E. 
160 See generally 2006 AMLICTF Act, supra note 154. 
161 See Crown Limited Annual Report 2013, CROWN RESORTS at 40, 43 (Oct. 
30, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.crownresorts.com.auJCrownResorts/files/fl/flcfa 
710-8bea-4a2b-86b6-a3fa55277614.pdf ("The gaming industry in Nevada is highly 
regulated and Crown Limited (Crown) must maintain relevant licences [sic] to 
continue its investments in entities with gaming operations in Nevada .... Because 
Crown is involved in gaming ventures outside of Nevada ... Crown is also 
required to comply with certain reporting requirements imposed by the Nevada 
[Gaming Control] Act."). 
162 NEV. GAMING COMM'N, DISPOSITION (Dec. 19, 2013), available at gaming. 
nv .gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=85 l 3. 
163 Our Resorts, CROWN RESORTS, http://www.crownresorts.com.au/our-
resorts (last visited June 12, 2015). 
164 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.720(1) (2014) ("A licensee shall not, in a foreign 
gaming operation, knowingly: [ v ]iolate a foreign, federal, tribal, state, county, city 
or township law, regulation, ordinance or rule, or any equivalent thereof, 
concerning the conduct of gaming."). 
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Even after considering all of this, it is important to keep in mind that 
jurisdictions with strong AML frameworks are still susceptible to money 
laundering. Casinos can still be vulnerable to money laundering activities even 
when they arc subject to, and complying with, numerous AML requirements 
from various jurisdictions. However, the presence of strong AML laws165 can 
genre as a significant deterrent because criminals and money launderers face a 
heightened risk of detection, which increases the cost of money laundering 
. 166 
services. 
B. Gaming Sectors with Inadequate AML Regulations 
There are numerous jurisdictions throughout the world that encourage 
money laundering either tacitly, by having lax AML regulations and/or not 
enforcing the regulations they do have, or expressly, by refusing to criminalize 
1 d . 167 money aun enng. 
The countries most likely to encourage money laundering are small nations 
with developing economies because, for them, the costs of crime are often far 
lower than the benefits reaped from doing business with criminals. 168 In fact, 
165 This statement assumes that the governing bodies in these jurisdictions are 
actually enforcing the applicable AML regulations. 
166 The heightened risk of detection translates into a higher cost associated 
with laundering money, allowing the launderer to charge a premium for their 
services and subsequently lower profits for the criminals. Because money 
laundering is the only way for a criminal to actually use his illicit gains, and 
because effective money laundering reduces the likelihood that the criminal will 
ultimately be detected, the premium paid to money launderers is economically 
worthwhile. However, as businessmen and women, criminals realize that they can 
lower their costs by laundering their money in jurisdictions where the AML 
regulations are either facially inadequate or are simply not stringently enforced. 
Hinnerk Gnutzmann et al., Dancing with the Devil: Country Size and the Incentive 
to Tolerate Money Laundering, 30 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 244, 247. 
Additionally, economists who study money laundering have long accepted an 
equation for detennining the "attractiveness" of a country or jurisdiction to money 
launderers. This formula, known as "the Walker equation," essentially totals 
numeric representations of a country's AML policies and then subtracts from that 
total the numeric representations of that country's level of corruption and conflict. 
For an in-depth discussion of the economic models used in money laundering 
research, see Joras Ferwerda et al., Graviry Models of Trade-Based Money 
Laundering, 45 APPLIED ECON., 3170, 3172. 
167 There have even been uncommon occurrences when a government will 
essentially invite money launderers to use their banks in an attempt to stimulate the 
local economies. Gnutzmann et al., supra note 166, at 244, 247 (describing when 
the Seychelles publically announced that it would not prosecute anyone for money 
laundering). 
168 Id. at 249-50. 
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scholars have suggested that nearly half of the money laundered worldwide is 
laundered through developing nations, partially because these are the countries 
with the most tenuous infrastrnctures and-more cynically-with 
figures who are more concerned with making money than with international 
AML cooperation. 169 
It should be unsurprising then, that these jurisdictions have little or no 
regulation of the gaming sector. 170 Due to the international shift towards 
legalizing gambling, the insufficient AML regulations in these developing 
nations pose a greater risk of creating money-laundering havens than ever 
before. 171 The legalization of gambling in emerging markets poses two main 
threats: that land-based casinos in these jurisdictions will be used to launder 
money; and (2) that independent online casinos and poker rooms will 
incorporate within these jurisdictions, and will therefore not be subject to the 
stricter regulations faced by online gaming operators who incorporate in other 
countries. 172 
A number of countries that have legal land-based casinos are currently on 
the FATF's most recent list of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. 173 
Many problems that the F ATF cite regarding these high-risk jurisdictions are 
inadequate laws criminalizing money laundering. 174 This necessarily lowers the 
costs associated with laundering illicit funds, making these gaming sectors 
more vulnerable to money laundering than more strictly regulated 
. . d. . 175 juris ictions. -
However, not all vulnerable gaming sectors appear on the FATF's list of 
high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. Take, for example, the 
Seychelles. 176 The Seychelles is not named on the FATF high-risk jurisdiction 
list; 177 however, the most recent Mutual Evaluation Report of the Seychelles 
169 ,d. at 250. 
170 See generally FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-21. 
171 See id. at 20. 
172 See id.; infra Part VI.C. 
173 See FATF HIGH-RISK JURISDICTIONS, supra note 144 (providing names and 
details of countries assessed by the FATF to have insufficient AML regulations); 
see also FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-20 (detailing the 
countries that have legalized gambling, and the number of land-based casinos in 
each). 
174 See generally FATF HIGH-RISK JURISDICTIONS, supra note 144. 
175 See Gnutzmann et al., supra note 166, at 247, 250. 
176 The Republic of Seychelles is an African archipelago located off the coast 
of Madagascar. It is a fairly young nation, having only achieved independence from 
the United Kingdom in mid-1976. For more detailed information, see The World 
Factbook: Seychelles, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/se.html (last updated May 18, 2015). 
177 See FATF HIGH-RISK JURISDICTION, supra note 144. 
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found it to be "non-compliant" with the FATF 40 Recommendations. 178 The 
Mutual Evaluation Report highlighted some key AML deficiencies to 
the sector, that identity verification and other of 
d dili . d 179 Th d f' . . . customer ue 1gence were not practice . ese e iciencies may exist 
because the legislation that imposed customer due diligence
on financial institutions and DNFBPs--the Anti-Money 
Act of 2006--had been enacted not long before the mutual 
evaluation took 180 The Mutual Evaluation Report noted that, although a 
Financial Unit had been established to ensure implementation of 
the of the AML Act, "no supervision was being undertaken at the 
time of the onsite visit and compliance with the provisions of the AML Act is 
" 181 However, the FATF also reported in 2009 that AML 
gaming sector were poorly regulated, indicating that it was 
the of the A.ML Act that made customer due diligence 
non-existent. 182 
Further global money laundering preventi
that casinos with inadequate A.ML regulation and with 
those in high-risk jurisdictions--often have no apparent ties to Nevada, placing 
them outside the regulatory oversight of the Nevada Gaming Commission .183 
Unlike the casinos in Macau, casinos in these 
are not jeopardizing their ability to operate Las Vegas casinos 
when they to the information gathering and reporting 
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and other AML regulations. 184 The lack 
of accountability to agencies like the Nevada Gaming Commission creates 
something of a regulatory vacuum for casinos and their local governments, 
allowing the individual casinos to profit from money laundering by skirting 
international AML standards, and also allowing that country's government to 
benefit from an economy that attracts gamblers seeking anonymity. The other 
main economic benefit to countries with lax AML regulations and oversight is 
178 See E. & So. AFR. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING GRP., MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING & COMBATTING THE FINANCING OF 
TERRORISM: THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES 176, 178-95 August 2008, [hereinafter 
SEYCHELLES EVALUATION] available at http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/ 
Seychelles_Muiual_Evaluation_Report.pdf. For more infonnation about the mutual 
evaluation process, see Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round AlvH/CFT 
Mutual Evaluations, supra note 137. 
179 SEYCHELLES EVALUATION, supra note 175, at 133, 140. 
180 FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 12, 35. 
181 .ld. at 18. 
182 See FATF VULNERABILITIES REPORT, supra note 8, at 14. 
183 See generally ;Macau Hearing, supra note 21 (prepared statement of 
A.G. Burnett). 
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that they are a haven for proprietors of online casinos looking for a base of 
operations. 
C. Online Gaming 
One of the most recent money laundering threats comes from the rise of 
online gambling. The availability of online gambling opportunities has 
skyrocketed in the past decade, with roughly 85 nations having legalized e-
gaming.18s 
The legality of online gambling in the United States was unclear in the 
1990s and early 2000s. However, it all but disappeared in 2006 with the 
passage of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act ("UIGEA''). 186 
The UIGEA criminalized the "acceptance of any payment instrument for 
unlawful Internet gambling," but did not define what constituted "unlawful 
Internet gambling."187 The passage of the UIGEA and its aftermath left Internet 
gambling in a legal gray area, scaring players offline and companies 
overseas. 188 Although the United States has not yet legalized online gambling at 
the federal level, individual states have begun issuing licenses allowing virtual 
poker rooms and casinos to operate, so long as there are safeguards in place to 
ensure that no one under the age of 21, or outside the state's boundaries, can 
185 David 0. Stewart, Online Gambling Five Years After UIGEA, AM. GAMING 
Ass'N 1, 2 (May 2011) [hereinafter AGA WHITE PAPER], http://www.american 
gaming.org/ sites/ default/files/uploads/ docs/final_ online _gambling_ white _paper_ 5-
18-11. pdf. 
186 Not a distinct piece of legislation itself, the UIGEA is the name for Title 
VIII of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act ("SAFE Port Act," Pub. 
L. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006)) [hereinafter "UIGEA''], available at http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ PLA W-109publ34 7 /html/PLA W-109publ34 7 .htm. 
187 For a more thorough discussion of the UIGEA, its passage, and its contents, 
see Prof. I. Nelson Rose, Implementation of the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act, GAMBLING & THE LAW (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.gamblingand 
thelaw.com/index.php/articles/255-implementation-of-the-unlawful-internet-
gambling-enforcement-act. 
188 Nate Silver, After "Black Friday," American Poker Faces Cloudy Future, 
N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011, 8:47 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2011/04/20/after-black-friday-american-poker-faces-cloudy-future/? _php=true 
&_type=blogs&_r=l. The "Black Friday" that Mr. Silver refers to is not the post-
Thanksgiving retail extravaganza. Rather, Mr. Silver is referencing April 15, 2011, 
when a 52-page indictment led to the three largest online poker companies that 
serviced U.S. players-Pokerstars, Full Tilt Poker, and Absolute Poker/Ultimate 
Bet-getting shut down. Eleven people affiliated with these sites were arrested for 
violating the UIGEA, among other things, even though they were headquartered in 
jurisdictions where Internet gambling is legal. Matt Richtel, Authorities Crack 
Down on 3 Poker Sites, NY DMES, at Bl (Apr. 16, 2011). 
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access the online gaming. 189 The ability for companies to operate these online 
casinos and poker rooms is the result of a Department of Justice ("DOJ") 
opinion which determined that the Wire Act only applied to Internet spmis 
betting, thereby removing licensed online gaming from the ill-defined category 
of "unlawful Internet gambling," and putting it outside the purview of the 
UI GEA. 190 Furthermore, by construing the Wire Act so that it applies to 
sports wagering, the DOJ has allowed certain forms of Internet gambling to 
come under the regulatory authority of state gaming commissions. 191 
But what of Americans who live in states where online gambling is illegal? 
Are they stuck with play-money websites or forced to travel to brick-and-
mortar casinos? 
Unfortunately not. There are millions of dollars to be culled from 
American gamblers looking to play online, and those do1lars are not about to be 
left on the table. The American Gaming Association has estimated that 
Americans gamble approximately $4 billion online every year, 192 and although 
it is unclear what impact the recent legalization of online gaming in certain 
States will have on that figure, even a small percentage of that $4 billion 
estimate is worth competing for. However, the reputable and well-regulated 
companies who left after the UIGEA enactment have not yet returned to the 
American marketplace. This has made the American Internet gambling 
population vulnerable to gambling websites that have poor regulation and 
oversight, if any. 
In order to court American gamblers, some of these websites-which are 
often based in offshore jurisdictions with poor Anti-Money Laundering 
. f 193 . . l . 194 Th . f m rastructures -promise anonymity to t heir customers. e promise o 
189 Seth McLaughlin, Billionaires Push in Their Chips in National Online 
Gambling Debate, THE WASH. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2014), at Al. 
190 Whether Proposals by Ill. & N.Y to Use the Internet & Out-Of-State 
Transaction Processors to Sell Lottery Tickets to In-State Adults Violate The Wire 
Act, Mem. Op. Asst. Att'y Gen., Sept. 20, 2011, available at http://www.justice. 
gov/sites/ default/files/ olc/ opinions/2011/09/31 /state-lotteries-opinion. pdf 
(concluding that the Wire Act only applied to online sports betting). 
191 Although the UIGEA expressly provided that "unlawful Internet gambling" 
did not apply to intrastate transactions, it also required that the "method" of placing 
the bet be "expressly authorized by" State law. Until the DOJ interpreted the Wire 
Act to only prohibit online sports betting, States seemed reluctant to legalize 
intrastate online gambling. See UIGEA, supra note 186; Andrew Doughman, Only 
the Big Fish Allowed to Swim in Nevada's Online Gambling Pool, LAS VEGAS SUN 
(Mar. 3, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/mar/03/only-big 
-fish-allowed-swim-nevadas-online-gambling/. 
192 AGA WHITE PAPER, supra note 185, at 1. 
193 Id. at 4, 8. 
194 One of the more conspicuous websites offering total anonymity to U.S. 
gamblers is called CoinBet, and will be discussed later in this section. 
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anonymity is important to American gamblers who wish to circumvent the 
online gambling prohibition of the United States, however it also creates an 
opportunity for these websites to be used, knowingly or unwittingly, as a way 
around basic AML protocol, namely Customer Due Diligence. 195 
One of the more ingenious and troubling exploitations of legal gray-area 
has come from a gambling website named CoinBet. 196 In order to set up an 
account on CoinBet, all a gambler needs is an email address, a password, and 
an e-wallet full of Bitcoins. 197 In order to get Bitcoins, all a gambler-or 
money launderer-needs is an e-wallet. 198 And in order to get an e-wallet, all 
anyone needs is an email address, mobile phone number, an IP address, and a 
two-factor identification token. 199 No personal information is necessary to 
obtain any of those things. Accordingly, CoinBet touts that "you will never 
have to reveal your identity, provide ID documents, or ... even worry if [the 
cryptocurrency gambling websites] accept players from your jurisdiction."200 
CoinBet accepts Bitcoins, which is a type of decentralized virtual currency that 
is not yet recognized by any country as legal tender.201 Accepting Bitcoins is 
195 See supra, note 86, and accompanying text. 
196 CoinBet® Launches a "Game Changing" Bitcoin Processing Online 
Casino, SportsBook, & Poker Site, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.pm 
ewswire.com/news-releases/coinbet-launches-a-game-changing-bitcoin-processing-
online-casino-sportsbook--poker-site-2414 75051.html. 
197 FAQ, CoINBET, https://web.archive.org/web/20140226230750/http:/lwww 
.coinbet.cc/pages/faq#.VUbD4UsOmoY (last visited May 3, 2015). Since the time 
of the initial writing of this article, CoinBet has morphed into something of a 
broker, providing gamblers-or money launderers-with a plethora of information 
and links to numerous websites that accept bitcoins or other cryptocurrency, and 
offer anonymous gaming. See COINBET.COM. For the sake of simplicity, any 
reference to CoinBet as a gambling website should be understood to mean any of 
the gambling websites that CoinBet promotes and directs users to. 
198 See Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last 
visited June 14, 2015). 
199 Block Explorer AP!, BLOCKCHAIN INFO, https://blockchain.info/wallet (last 
visited June 14, 2015) (explaining how to set up and use an e-wallet). "Two-factor 
authentication is a strong authentication method where the user provides two types 
of identification. Two-factor authentication combines something you know (a PIN 
or a password) with something you have (a physical device like a YubiKey)." 
Frequently Asked Questions, YUBICO, http://www.yubico.com/support/faq/ (last 
visited June 14, 2015). 
200 CoinBet® Launch, supra note 196. 
201 It is unclear whether or not CoinBet has truly found a legal loophole to the 
UIGEA, since they admittedly convert a gambler's Bitcoins into USD (or other 
local currency) upon its deposit, and turn currency winnings back into Bitcoins 
when the gambler wants to cash out. Since Bitcoins can be traded and exchanged 
for legal tender, they may well be considered "something of value" under the 
language of the UIGEA's definition of "bet or wager." See UIGEA, supra note 
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what allows CoinBet to offer its customers full anonymity because Bitcoins 
themselves are generally anonymous and untraceable.202 
This degree of anonymity is only permissible for a company like CoinBet 
because its gaming licenses were issued by Costa Rica.203 Costa Rica has 
notoriously lax AML regulations, and does not have a regulatory or oversight 
system for online casinos.204 Unlike the poker websites that were shut down on 
Black Friday, the anonymity of CoinBet's customers, along with the 
unknowable source of the Bitcoins funding a CoinBet gambler's account, may 
well place an online casino like CoinBet just outside of the reach the U.S. 
Department of Justice and other forms of traditional AML regulation. 
Although some scholars suggest that online poker and online gambling do 
not pose a significant risk of money laundering, that conclusion is based on 
information from well-regulated casinos in jurisdictions that have implemented, 
and actively enforce, AML legislation that is in line with the F ATF 40 
Recommendations.205 However, the FATF has yet to promulgate specific 
recommendations regarding online gambling, and does not appear to consider 
186. However, that question-as well as a thorough explanation of what Bitcoins 
are and how they work-is far beyond the scope of this article. For a primer on 
Bitcoins, see Andrew Byrne & Will Hallatt, Bitcoin or Bitcon?, 18 No. 8 
CYBERSPACE LAW. 13 (Sep. 2013). 
202 See generally Dr. Robert Stokes, Anti-Money Laundering Regulation and 
Emerging Payment Technologies, 32 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POLICY REP. 1, 1 
(May 2013) (looking at the role that Bitcoins and other virtual currency play in the 
international AML effort). Although Dr. Stokes gives a wonderfully comprehensive 
overview of Bitcoins and the AML efforts that would generally occur when 
Bitcoins are part of a generally regulated transaction, he does not take into account 
a business transaction using Bitcoins that is purposefully unregulated, as appears to 
be the case with CoinBet. 
203 See Jon Matonis, Legal Online Gambling is Next Major Bitcoin Market, 
CoINDESK (JAN. 30, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/legal-online-gambling-next-
major-bitcoin-market/ ("Unlike other regulated gambling jurisdictions issuing 
licenses, Costa Rica does not require operators to obtain and verify the identity of 
its players."). 
204 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & L. ENFORCEMENT, 
Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern 108-110 (June 2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov I documents/ organization/2113 96. pdf ("The unregulated online 
gaming and casino industries pose significant risks for money laundering. The 
legislature rejected proposed provisions to create a regulatory body when it passed 
a recent gaming bill."); AGA WHITE PAPER, supra note 185, at 4. 
205 Friedrich Schneider, Money Laundering and Online Poker: How Relevant?, 
17 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 714, 724 (2013) (looking at the German model of 
state-monopolized gambling, and concluding that online gambling is not an 
efficient way to launder money); Michael Levi, E-Gaming & Money Laundering 
Risks: A European Overview, 10 ERA FORUM 533, 545 (2009) (concluding that e-
gaming in Europe posed a "modest" risk of being used for money laundering). 
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such regulation, or lack thereof, when determining a jurisdiction's level of 
compliance in its mutual evaluation reports.206 
VII. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY 
In the last few years, there has been a push to legalize gaming in markets 
that were once thought to be out ofreach for casino operators.207 Additionally, 
there has been significant movement towards legalizing online gambling in 
numerous jurisdictions.208 However, the gaming sector remains vulnerable to 
money laundering operations because, like the criminals looking to launder 
money, casinos deal almost exclusively in cash; or, in the case of unregulated 
online casinos, virtual currency like Bitcoins. 
As detailed above, certain jurisdictions scrutinize gaming establishments to 
ensure compliance with strict AML procedures.209 A prime example of this can 
be found by looking at the Macanese casinos of Nevada gaming licensees: 
because of the Nevada Gaming Commission's strict oversight and broad 
authority to revoke Las Vegas gaming licenses for conduct occurring overseas, 
the Nevada licensees' casinos offer some of the most robust compliance with 
AML regulations in Macau.210 
However, this is clearly not enough. Nevada gaming authorities 
acknowledge their oversight of Nevada licensees' foreign properties is limited: 
although Nevada licensees are discouraged from being complicit to criminal 
activities, the Nevada Gaming Commission only has the authority to revoke a 
Nevada gaming license.211 Given the enormous profitability of Macanese 
casinos, specifically the VIP rooms therein, and the somewhat stagnant gaming 
market in Las Vegas, it is possible that the threat of losing one's Nevada 
gaming license may not always be a sufficient crime deterrent.212 Furthermore, 
206 Presently, it does not appear that the FATF has any regulations or guidance 
regarding virtual currencies like Bitcoins, and national regulatory agencies have 
only recently begun issuing guidance on this issue. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT 
NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., FIN-2013-GOOl, APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S 
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL 
CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/ 
guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-GOO 1. pdf. 
201 See generally, e.g., Luis Goncalves, Asia Pacific to Have 17 New Casinos 
by 2020, MACAUBUSINESSDAILY (June 17, 2015), http://macaubusinessdaily.com/ 
Gaming/ Asia-Pacific-have- I 7 -new-casinos-2020. 
208 See supra Part VI.C. 
209 See supra Part II, Part VI.A. 
210 Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 41 (prepared statement of A.G. Burnett). 
211 Id. at 42-43. 
212 See Howard Stutz, Gaming Revenue Shifts Trend, Rises 7. 75% in State, 
15.4% on Strip, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Feb. 27, 2015 1:55 PM), http://www. 
reviewj ournal. com/business/ casinos-gaming/ gaming-revenue-shifts-trend-rises-77 5 
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Macanese casinos without ties to Nevada are not subiect to the same scrutiny 
and need for AML compliance.213 The difference in regulation requirements 
and enforcement between Macau and Nevada creates potential economic 
incentives for individual casinos to be complicit or active participants in money 
1 d . h ?]4 laun enng sc emes.-
The schism between Nevadan and Macanese AML regulations, although 
wide, is nothing compared to the divide between well-regulated casinos in 
jurisdictions like the United States, Australia, or the European Union and the 
unregulated land- and Internet-based casinos in offshore havens like the 
Seychelles and Costa Rica.215 Although the FATF can make recommendations, 
encourage compliance with a basic level of AML regulations, and conduct 
mutual evaluations of member states every few years, it has no enforcement 
authority and does not restrict its focus to the gaming industry. 
In order to maintain-or increase---the integrity and reputation of the 
gaming industry on a global scale, it seems necessary to have a multi-national 
gaming oversight board with both regulatory and enforcement capabilities. 
This is the only way that the AML standards in casinos around the world could 
be made uniform. Unifonnity would provide two major benefits to the industry 
and casino operators alike: (1) having a uniform set of AML protocols, with 
one regulatory agency charged with enforcing these protocols, would make the 
entire gaming sector less vulnerable to money laundering operations; and by 
enacting and enforcing identical AML regulations on all casinos and gaming 
establishments, casino operators would be protected from losing revenues to 
less-scrupulous competitors. 
In tem1s of making the gaming sector less vulnerable to accepting and 
laundering illicit funds, one need only look at the fallout from the UIGEA to 
see the impact that discordant regulatory schemes have on the gaming industry. 
-percent-state-154-percent-strip (stating that January 2015 ended "five straight 
months of declining revenue"). 
213 The largest of these casino operators is SJM Holdings (which stands for 
"Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, S.A."). SJM is owned and run by Stanley Ho, the 
former gaming monopoly holder, who is alleged to have significant ties to triads 
and known triad members. See Macau Hearing, supra note 21, at 39; Anne 
Milgram & John Lichtblau, Special Report of the Div. of Gaming Enforcement to 
the Casino Control Comm 'n on its Investigation of MGM Mirage's Joint Venture 
with Ho in Macau, Special Admin. Region, People's Republic of China, 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF L. & PUB. SAFETY, May 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/casinos/home/info/docs/MGM/dge_%20report_redacted.pdf 
(finding Pansy Ho "unsuitable" because of Stanley Ho's alleged connections to 
organized crime). 
214 For a general discussion of economic incentives for institutional 
cooperation with money launderers, see generally Gnutzmann et aL, supra note 
166, at 249-252. 
215 Part VI.B. 
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Banning, rather than regulating, Internet gambling merely drove it offshore to 
jurisdictions that had no AML legislation. This, in turn, has created unique 
opportunities for criminals seeking anonymity to find conduits through which 
they can launder the proceeds of their crimes. Imposing a uniform set of laws, 
with a uniform set of consequences, would eliminate the possibility of the 
gaming equivalent of forum shopping. Persons and companies would no longer 
be able to exploit the weaknesses in the international AML structure as it 
relates to gaming, and they would not be able to avoid the costs associated with 
performing Customer Due Diligence checks and filing CTRs or SAR-Cs. 
Furthermore, creating an intergovernmental gaming oversight agency, 
similar to FA TF, would take a significant burden off of local and national 
governments. This, in turn, would permit the local and national governments to 
allocate their AML/CFT resources away from the gaming sector while 
simultaneously increasing the efficacy of detecting money-laundering 
operations within the gaming industry itself. An international oversight body 
would also allow for a list of excluded persons, so that known cheaters and 
criminals could not, after being discovered in one jurisdiction or property, 
exploit unaffiliated casinos and jurisdictions.216 
A uniform set of regulations would also remove the disincentive for 
casinos to comply with AML protocols. Looking at the Macanese VIP rooms in 
particular, it currently may be of great economic value for a casino operator to 
be willfully ignorant of what transpires between the junket operators and VIP 
patrons. Even for a Nevada licensee operating in Macau, the lure of hundreds 
of millions dollars from VIP Baccarat revenue is a strong incentive to leave the 
shroud of secrecy surrounding the VIP rooms and players intact. Although 
there is no evidence to suggest that Nevada licensees in Macau shirk any AML 
reporting requirements on the main, mass-market casino floor, there is little 
evidence that any Macanese casinos are attempting to totally dismantle the VIP 
rooms or the strict privacy laws that guard them. This is, in part, because 
Nevada regulators cannot hold the Nevada licensee responsible for what 
transpires in the VIP rooms, because those rooms are generally subcontracted 
out to the VIP promoters. As such, the Nevada Gaming Commission has no 
authority to enter or inspect the transactions within the VIP rooms. If, however, 
there was one international gaming oversight board, those regulators would 
enjoy unfettered access to all aspects of gaming establishments, regardless of 
the physical location in which it was located. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
When considering the idea of multinational cooperative gaming regulation 
216 This could also potentially help problem gamblers who self-exclude from 
one property or jurisdiction by automatically disseminating that information among 
brick-and-mortar and online casinos worldwide. 
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and enforcement, it is essential to keep in mind that money laundering is a 
crime that has a global impact. The proceeds of a crime in one jurisdiction can 
be laundered in another, and the laundered money can be used to fund crime or 
terrorism in yet another distinct jurisdiction. Money laundering keeps illicit 
international trade alive by keeping the trafficking of any commodity-be it 
drugs, guns, or humans-profitable. Certainly, creating a singular entity for 
AML regulation in the gaming industry would not eliminate money laundering 
as a whole, nor will it be a panacea for crime. However, it is feasible that such 
an oversight body could greatly reduce the amount of money being laundered, 
both wittingly and unwittingly, through gaming operations. 
As borderless, virtual currencies develop, the AML regulations of the 
gaming industry must too. As the technology of the world develops, the world 
grows smaller, and the need for international cooperation becomes more 
essential. As more and more nations and jurisdictions legalize gambling, both 
on land and online, there become more opportunities for money launderers to 
exploit developing nations that generally have shaky infrastructures and if 
any, AML regulations. Although the gaming industry can create great revenue 
and employment opportunities in nations like these, it is important that those 
revenues not be generated at the expense of the international community, or the 
gaming industry's reputation. With so much money at stake from mass-market 
gaming floors in Las Vegas, to VIP Rooms in Macau, and thousands of 
websites in between, raising the bar of AML regulatory compliance, and 
creating a multinational cooperative gaming oversight committee may be the 
only way to level the competitive playing field. 
